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INTRODUCTION 
This submission outlines the extent of drought in Western 
Australia in 1982/83, examines the adequacy of drought assist­ 
ance measures and, after canvassing alternative assistance 
measures, proposes a preferred package of drought assistance 
measures. 
The issue of whether or not the non-farm sector in rural 
areas should receive drought assistance, and if so what 
type, is not addressed in this submission. Rather the 
framework of discussion is restricted to the farm sector. 
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THE EXTENT OF DROUGHT 
A. Drought Declarations 
As is shown in Figure 1 drought declarations in Western 
Australia in 1982/83 were confined to two agricultural 
areas - the north east of the wheatbelt (involving 
approximately 300 farms) and the Lower Great Southern 
region (involving about 1150 farms).  
Parts of both these regions have experienced numerous 
droughts in recent years as Figure 2 suggests. The 
north-east of the wheatbelt in particular has been exposed 
to prolonged drought. Significant parts of the local 
government areas of Mullewa, Morawa, Perenjori, Dalwallinu, 
Koorda and Mt Marshall have been drought-declared in 
5 of the last 6 years, with smaller sections experiencing 
drought in each of the 6 years. 
By contrast the Lower Great Southern region has been 
less frequently exposed to drought. Areas of Ravensthorpe 
and Gnowangerup (around Jerramungup) have been drought 
declared in 3 of the past 6 years but most of the Lower 
Great Southern is relatively free of drought. Areas 
north of Esperance have been drought declared a few 
times in recent years. 
The numbers of Western Australian farmers drought-declared 
in each of the past 7 years are estimated to have been: 
1976-77 2 670 
1977-78 2 510 
1978-79 170 
1979-80 l 30 
1980-81 3 9 2 l  
1981-82 302 
1982-83 1 450 
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In Western Australia recommendations for drought status 
are based on subjective assessments of the effects of 
drought on crop yields and finances together with consider­ 
ation of the needs of livestock. 
Subjectivity in drought assessment is not unique to 
Western Australia as information in Table 1 indicates: 
Table l :  Bases of Drought Declaration 
State Basis 
Western Australia 
Victoria 
New South Wales 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Subjective assessment of crop, 
pasture, stock, water, erosion 
and financial conditions. 
Rainfall as compared to average 
and with reference to its incidence; 
availability of paddock feed, 
fodder reserves and stock water; 
numbers and condition of stock. 
If stock are not hand-fed or watered 
they will die. 
Effect of season on stock, pastures, 
crops and primary production generally. 
Subjective assessment of crop, 
pasture, stock and water conditions, 
The plethora of bases for drought assistance in 1982/83 
and their inherent subjectivity when applied has probably 
caused some inconsistencies in the levels of assistance 
provided to farms both within and between areas. These 
observations point to the possible need for a uniform 
and objective basis for drought declaration. 
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An objective basis for drought declarations would have 
obvious appeal, However, it does have real practical 
difficulties. 
The impact of drought can be observed in its obvious 
effects on pastures, crops and animals. However, it 
is not possible to monitor performance of growth or 
stress as indicators of drought because the performance 
of plants and animals is much affected by other factors 
- notably management. 
An alternative measure which has been used is rainfall. 
For example, a working party of the W . A .  Drought Con­ 
sultative Committee investigated objective monitoring 
of drought in 1977, and concluded: 
"Following the receipt of a request for declaration, 
the Drought Consultative Committee should accept that 
where any two consecutive months in the growing season 
are in the first 10% rainfall decile, then prima facie 
evidence of drought exists . . .  "  
The use of this sort of formula can have serious short­ 
comings. One obvious problem for many new farming areas 
in Western Australia is that only limited rainfall records 
are available. For some areas records have been kept 
for only 5 or 10 years. These are drought-prone areas, 
to the problem of inadequate records can be a recurring 
one. 
Another possible problem is the use of say, two consecutive 
months in the lower 10% of rainfall decile. It is quite 
possible, for example, to have good opening rains in 
April-May, followed by a very dry June-July, and then 
good finishing rains. Such a rainfall pattern could 
produce a bumper season. 
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Figure 1 Drought-Declared Areas in 1982/3 
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A third potential problem, at least in the less populated 
areas is variability within districts.  Rainfall is 
measured in some areas, at widely separated locations. 
There is usually one recording point in a shire. The 
Western Australian experience has been that one part 
of a Shire can be clearly in drought while another part 
of the same Shire is experiencing a good season. 
THE COST OF DROUGHT 
As time and information constraints do not allow an estimate 
of all drought-induced costs and losses, only some drought 
costs are estimated. 
In the north east of the wheatbelt drought costs mainly 
involve reductions in cereal revenues resulting from low 
yields.  An estimate of revenue reduction was gained by 
first estimating yield loss .  Co-operative Bulk Handling 
(CBH) provided comparisons of grain receivals at bins in 
drought-affected areas over two seasons. The CBH data gave 
indications of likely yield reductions in 1982/83. Knowing 
the distribution of drought-declared farms among local 
government areas, using average farm approximations (derived 
from ABS agricultural census data) and using CBH data and 
field adviser opinions, the 1982/83 cereal revenue decline 
was estimated at $18.5  million. 
For the Lower Great Southern region a similar estimation 
procedure gave an estimate of crop revenue reduction as 
$ 1 3 . 0  million. Thus the estimated value of cereal yield 
losses due to drought in 1982/83 1n Western Australia is 
$ 3 1 . 5  mill1on. 
An indication of the cumulative effects of drought is given 
in Attachment l .  This survey of farmers was first  made 
after they had suffered three years of drought and was 
repeated three years later. No information is available 
on the initial position when the first drought occurred. 
However the rise in average debts in the second three year 
period 1s most significant rising from $8l 770 to $175 936. 
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Other drought costs include costs associated with stock 
losses, reduced wool cuts, reduced lambing, reduced stock 
numbers and additional expenditure on fodder and agistment. 
No attempt has been made to estimate these costs or the 
multiplier effects associated with revenue losses and input 
changes; suffice to say these costs,  especially in the Lower 
Great Southern where sheep-dominant enterprises prevail, 
are likely to be at least as large as cereal revenue reductions. 
Attachment 2 illustrates the longer term effects of drought 
on a livestock farm. 
A RATIONALE FOR DROUGHT ASSISTANCE 
Drought assistance is a form of temporary aid. It is aimed 
to sustain farmers and farm resources through a seriously 
adverse season or seasons. The aid is seen as temporary 
because, almost by definition, a drought is assessed relative 
to some measure of a normal seasonal condition. A return 
to normal seasons will remove the immediate cause of the 
problem which drought assistance addresses. 
Droughts are, however, essentially a financial problem. 
(This statement is qualified later) .  From a policy development 
view, then, droughts can be considered as similar to any 
other factors, external to the farm business, which cause 
a pronounced short term reduction in farm returns. We return 
to this point in the discussion of policy measures. 
While a drought is much like any other external factor in 
that its consequences are financial, it may be difficult 
in its impact on the capacity of the farm business to recover 
after the adverse event has passed. To an extent, capacity 
to recover depends on the severity of an event rather than 
its nature - a severe price fall may be equally difficult 
to recover from as a drought. However, a drought can be 
different when it leads to loss or damage of resources. 
For example, the loss of a farm flock in a national drought 
may mean that it will be several years before the flock 
number can be re-established. Again, injury to soils under 
drought conditions may take many years to rectify. 
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The arguments for assistance to farmers affected by droughts 
can be based on the sorts of efficiency considerations discussed 
above, or on welfare considerations, or from a pragmatic 
acceptance of some political/social realities. 
Efficiency arguments have been acknowledged by the Industries 
Assistance Commission (IAC) in its 1975/76 Annual Report: 
"When a severe fall in profitability results from temporary 
factors peculiar to an industry there may be a strong case, 
on efficiency grounds, for the provision of temporary assist­ 
ance to a low cost industry to enable it to hold resources 
necessary for its long term development. In such cases 
assistance would avoid the cost of resource movements which 
would later need to be reversed". (IAC Annual Report 1975/76 
p. 1 3 ) .  Such a statement of principle is in accord with 
the I A C ' s  recommendation of short term assistance to the 
beef industry in 197l. The aim of this assistance "was 
to encourage these producers to remain in the industry who 
were in a position to operate profitably with low levels 
of assistance" (Approaches to General Reductions in Protection: 
Discussion Paper No. 2 :  Short Term Assistance During General 
Reduction in Protection).  
This argument has not received univeral acceptance. Freebairn' 
argues, on resource efficiency grounds, against providing 
an industry with temporary assistance to retain those resources 
necessary for its long term development. He classifies 
resources into industry specific and non industry specific. 
Freebairn argues that because industry specific resources 
have a low inter-industry opportunity value they may under 
conditions of a temporary decline in returns in one sector 
of an industry be absorbed by other sectors of the same 
industry not experiencing a decline in returns. Consequently, 
some if not all of the resources remain in the industry. 
1 .  Freebai rn,  J .  W .  "Pros and Cons of Temporary Indus try 
Assistance". A . J . A . E .  Vol. 2 2 ( 3 )  Dec. 1978. 
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In many instances this situation does not apply. For example, 
under continuing and widespread drought resources such as 
livestock have little intra-industry opportunity value. 
Therefore such resources are likely to be lost from that 
industry. The argument may apply to some resources in some 
localised droughts. However, to argue for temporary assistance 
only under widespread drought could lead to inequitable 
treatment between farmers. It would also be administratively 
difficult. 
The second case considered by Freebairn is the non industry­ 
specific resources (unskilled labour, light motor vehicles) .  
He argues that, not only are these resources more likely 
to leave the industry under conditions of a temporary slump, 
but they are also easier to replace when the downturn is 
reversed. Again, this argument is not generally valid. 
Under prolonged drought displaced unskilled labour, for 
example, is unlikely to be reabsorbed given the relocation 
costs of such resources. 
We consider that such efficiency considerations are important. 
Our general view is that farmers in a drought situation 
may be forced to a position where they sacrifice long term 
considerations for short term survival strategies. This 
may mean that they sell or destroy stock despite the likely 
high cost of replacement; that they sell machinery despite 
low salvage values; that they overstock fragile lands despite 
long term consequence. 
The purist would argue that the financial sector should 
cope with these situations. Banks should provide carry 
on funds to allow farmers to adopt the best long-term strategy .  
The reality is that banks are not able to take this view. 
They view with concern the low salvage value of drought 
affected farms, the resultant low equity position of farmers, 
and the apparent lack of security for the bank's funds. 
Banks tend to respond by providing less money when more 
is needed. 
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An additional argument based on efficiency considerations 
is compensatory assistance. Assistance to other sectors 
has eroded farmers terms of trade and made them less able 
to invest in drought management strategies such as IED's  
and drought insurance. 
Welfare considerations provide a further justification for 
drought assistance to farmers. Assistance is often necessary 
to cushion farmer incomes from the effects of drought, or 
to compensate them for losses in asset values, In this 
context, drought assistance parallels assistance provided 
to the unemployed or to earthquake victims, for example. 
Pragmatically it is recognised that Governments are committed, 
by precedent and social pressure, to assist those severely 
disadvantaged by large natural disasters. 
Droughts are no different to floods, fires or cyclones in 
this respect. 
We consider that the relevant question becomes what is the 
most appropriate form of assistance to farmers affected 
by drought. 
AN APPRAISAL OF 1982/83 DROUGHT ASSISTANCE MEASURES 
A. Assistance Categories and Levels 
For 1982/83 the following concessions and financial 
assistance are available to farmers in drought declared 
areas of the agricultural districts of Western Australia: 
l .  Interest subsidy 
2 .  Fodder subsidy 
3 .  Agistment fees 
4 .  Road and rail haulage 
1 )  transport of grain and redelivery of wheat 
1 1 )  transport of hay 
1 1 1 )  stock forwarded to and returning from agistment 
1v)  transport of stock purchased 
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5. Loans to primary producers 
6. Assistance in water deficient areas. 
A description of these schemes is given in an appended 
document. 
Amounts of financial assistance provided under the various 
measures from 1976/77 to 1982/83 are given in Table 
2. Assistance 1n 1982/83 is only to mid-February 1983. 
B. A Critique of Assistance Measures 
An economic evaluation of the 1982/83 drought assistance 
measures reveals they suffer from several weaknesses 
w.ich can be outlined as: 
poorly targeted 
The 1982/83 drought assistance should have been designed 
to identify and aid those inordinately disadvantaged 
by drought. However, the assistance measures were 
also of benefit to many who were unaffected by drought. 
For example, the subsidisation of fodder and agistment 
resulted in grain growers and farmers with agistment 
land sharing in the assistance benefits. 
discouraging risk-offsetting management 
If farmers can expect drought assistance from government 
then the incentive for farmers to adopt risk offsetting 
strategies is reduced. Farmers are not encouraged 
to: 
i )  develop and hold grain and fodder reserves 
i i )  hold reserves of cash, bonds, off-farm invest­ 
ments or income equalisation deposits 
i i i )  reduce stocking rates 
iv) purchase land in areas less susceptible to 
drought' 
2. For a whimsical account of the four new rules of good farm 
management see Chatterton, B. "Preparing for the Next 
Drought", Australian Farm Management Newsletter, Vol 9 ( 1 0 )  
Nov. 1982. 
Table 2: Assistance Categories and Levels 
1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 
Freight subsidies on: 
Hay 49 134 27 668 27 504 1 1 3  041 170 268 4 905 
Grain 34 308 2 402 1 276 I 094 26 382 1 804 
Potatoes 9 352 
Stock to agistment 22 192 34 474 56 740 252 740 19 809 54 526 
Stock from agistment 42 848 145 094 156 804 103 935 510 697 12 802 
Stock purchased for restocking 11 721 10 252 9 152 26 765 1 076 
Stock to special sales 15 144 
Provision of water 131 793 10 974 3 686 102 139 125 517 40 644 547 
Clearing sand drift 136 299 
Interest subsidy n . a .  
Fodder subsidy 45 439 
Agistment fees (+ 
I 
Loans to primary producers r l, 
I 
Drought delegated agency 2 375 420 19 640 940 208 300 11 688 400 14 666 500 )3 212 200 ) 3 746 000 
Sharef armers & lessee 's  565 250 2 893 160 313  200 1 433 115 1 351 500 ) ) 
Pastoralists n . a .  655 500 292 990 1 006 101 0 
Beekeepers n . a .  114 000 22 000 0 
Cyclone Hazel 12 000 
Unemployment relief to shire 625 300 825 595 191 913 
Loans to small businesses 495 500 233 500 
TOTAL 3 839 206 24 359 1 18  1  755 496 14 522 019 18 369 770 3 429 539 3 846 512 
No. of loan approvals 
Drought delegated agency 210 873 78 520 759 
) 
Sharef armers & lessee 's  54 162 21 100 79 
156 ) 11 5  
4e  As at 17 February, 1983 
## As at February 1983 
he## As at 28 February, 1983 
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By depending on the government assistance, resource 
misallocation within agriculture is likely; leading 
to greater incentive both to farm in more drought 
susceptible 
strategies. 
to minimise 
As an illustration; a farmer 
drought losses by maintaining low stocking 
little 
areas and to adopt more risky management 
rates and adequate fodder reserves may receive 
who seeks 
or no government drought assistance. However, the 
farmer who maintains a higher stocking rate and low 
reserves of conserved fodder may receive greater 
government drought assistance. What many would believe 
to be poor management practices are not penalised 
but rather reimbursed. 
inequitable 
The forms of drought assistance lead to inequities 
in the distribution of assistance. As examples, 
the farmer displaying sound conservation management 
is disadvantaged vis-a-vis the farmer less concerned 
with conservation. The subsidisation of all interest 
payments has meant no necessary relationship between 
the level of assistance received and the degree 
of disadvantage suffered from drought. 
inadequate 
An inadequacy of the present drought relief loan 
system is that loans are made on a short term basis; 
that is effectively amortised over 7 years at 4 
per cent interest. However, as the data of Table 
3 show the immediate cash flow problems caused 
by drought could be eased by a loan over a longer 
period even at a higher rate of interest. 
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Table 3 :  Varying Terms for a $40 000 Loan 
Length 7 8 9 lC 
Interest Rate (%) 4 7 9 11 
Amortised Annual Payment ( $ )  6  664 6 700 6 672 6 792 
First Year Tax Deduction ( $ )  l  600 2 800 3 600 4 loo 
First Year Tax Savings ( $) 
Assume Taxable Income of $25 000 736 l 288 l 656 2 02l 
Assume Taxable Income of $16 000 491 859 l 105 l 350 
Assume Taxable Income of $ 7 000 490 778 778 778 
The advantage of a low interest loan is to some 
extent eroded by the smaller taxation deduction 
of interest payments. Even though a farmer with 
a loan at a higher interest rate over a longer 
term will pay more interest, in the initial years 
following a drought he may be advantaged through 
greater tax savings. 
The size of benefit is proportional to taxable 
income. If taxable income is low tax savings from 
the longer term interest rate loan are less than 
tax savings when taxable income is higher. As 
most ralrers have low taxable incomes following 
drought-! they will only benefit slightly in initial 
years from loans with higher rates and longer terms. 
consistent with other policy 
Clearly, policies for drought should be as consistent 
as possible with other rural policies. One possible 
conflict exists between drought policy and soil 
conservation policy. Soil and water conservation 
have become accepted as matters of national priority 
in Australia. This priority is at odds with a 
policy of subsidising on-farm feeding of stock 
in a drought. Even where a subsidy is also ext/:fded 
to the off-farm feeding of stock it may well be 
that the balance of the two measures is not always 
neutral. For some farmers the several measures 
will net out as an inducement to retain stock on 
farm - which may have deleterious effects on soils .  
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In periods of drought when the RAS would receive numerous 
applications for assistance, Federal and State Governments 
could diret most of their natural disaster relief 
funds for drought to the RAS. The RAS could act as 
agents to identify those farmers most in need of carry- 
on funds, and with prospects of long term viability. 
Where the long term viability of a farm is judged 
not to be jeopardised by factors beyond the farmer 1s 
control, that farmer would become eligible for an 
RAS loan. An important feature of the existing RAS 
scheme is the application of a flexible interest rate 
policy - and this should be continued. 
An advantage of chanelling assistance through the 
RAS would be the avoidance of the inequities and admin­ 
istrative difficulties of drought declarations. A 
case by case examination of farm finances would reveal 
individual needs for assistance; carry-on, household 
support or rehabilitation. Carry-on finace, for example, 
could be provided at levels and on terms necessary 
for a farm's long term viability - unlike the present 
arrangements where carry-on loans are limited to a 
maximum 7 year term. 
The provision of assistance via the RAS has the advantage 
of being specifically directed to give most assistance 
to those most in need of assistance. While all money 
would be provided by way of loans (not grants) through 
the RAS there would be the ability to provide greater 
assistance in times of harsher droughts by an increased 
subsidy element in the interest rate charged. 
B. Direct Subsidy 
As a general proposition we have argued that drought 
assistance should be by provision of special loan 
funds for farmers. 
There will be situations,  however, where specific 
policy objectives can be identified as part of a general 
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drought assistance package. These specific objectives 
might best be addressed by specific policy measures. 
One example would be the possible need in a national 
drought (as in 1982-83) to ensure that the national 
flock or herd was not too severely reduced in numbers. 
It may be adjudged that, without policy action, the 
national herd could be cut by, say, 20 per cent and 
this would cause a 30 per cent cut in productive capacity 
and effect processor viability for 8 years and lead 
to loss of export markets. Given this judgement, 
a specific policy action, such as a feed subsidy, 
may be considered a preferrable strategy to a more 
neutral form of assistance. 
Another example of a specific policy consideration 
would be the committment to a national soil and water 
conservation policy. 
In many pastoral areas of Western Australia (for example) 
a pastoralist in a drought situation may well not 
see economic justification, in the short-term at least, 
in actively de-stocking his property. Yet in terms 
of preserving a fragile ecology this may be the preferred 
strategy. Or from the point of view of soil conservation 
it may be the best long term strategy. In such a 
situation direct aid to assist de-stocking by agistment 
or other means may be an appropriate policy. 
C .  Insurance 
Another drought measure that the Commission may wish 
to consider is a formal drought insurance scheme. 
We are uncertain as to whether this is a practical 
proposal or how it might be made to work. Farmers 
can currently take out informal insurance by the use 
of I E D ' s ,  but they appear not to see this as an attractive 
investment. Farmers do, however, insure against other 
events such as hail. 
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This behaviour of farmers may be explained in terms 
of the high opportunity cost of scarce funds. However, 
a more likely explanation is that farmers do not see 
IED ' s  as an insurance mechanism. IED 's  are closely 
linked with the taxation system and IED's  are used 
as part of a taxation strategy. 
Despite some reservations we suggest that the IAC 
give consideration to a mechanism of formal drought 
insurance. 
Drought insurance schemes could offer a farmer a selection 
from a range of premiums, where the higher the premium 
the greater the insurance payout in a year of drought. 
The premium selected by a farmer would reflect his 
farming region's susceptibility to drought, his own 
risk preferences and his farm's financial status. 
In principal, membership of an insurance scheme need 
not be compulsory. However, on the basis of experience 
with other natural disaster relief schemes it is likely 
that insured farmers would receive less assistance 
than uninsured farmers. To avoid or minimise this 
"moral hazard", all farmers and insurance agencies 
would need to know well in advance what government 
assistance, if any, would be available in drought. 
Pragmatically, it may be necessary to make the insurance 
scheme compulsory. 
The scheme would also need to be based on an objective 
measurement of drought - for example, drought being 
defined to exist in any area where rainfall measurement 
indicating any two consecutive months in the growing 
season being in the first 10 per cent rainfall decile.  
Neither farmers nor insurance agencies should be able 
to manipulate the data or definitions required for 
objective measurement of drought and all definitions 
or measurement procedures should be unambiguous. 
All parties should have access to measurement results.  
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An advantage of an insurance scheme is the avoidance 
of resource misallocation costs that plague present 
measures of drought assistance. For example, present 
measures distort land markets by artificially raising 
or supporting land values in drought prone areas relative 
to areas free of drought. In contrast, premiums of 
the insurance scheme become part of operating costs 
and cannot artificially support land prices in drought 
prone areas if the premiums are solely on commercial 
considerations. 
There is conflicting evidence as to the practicability 
of insurance schemes that include drought cover. 
For example, an all risk crop insurance scheme implemented 
for Western Australian wheatgrowers in 197l was withdrawn 
after one year of operation. A compulsory banana 
crop insurance scheme was introduced in 1962 for Western 
Australian banana growers and it continues to operate. 
Whether commercial insurance firms would consider 
a drought cover scheme as impractical or of limited 
profitability requires further examination by insurance 
specialists, If commercial firms were unwilling to 
introduce a scheme then there may be a case for government 
undertaking the scheme (if  it is feasible) on a break­ 
even basis where in any year costs of administering 
the scheme, which include an allowance for average 
expected payouts, equate to expected premium receipts 
and investment returns. 
D. Interest Assistance 
This submission has argued that the major form of 
drought assistance to farmers should be loan monies 
provided through the RAS. 
A possible adjunct to this proposal, which the Commission 
might consider, is a system of subsidisation of interest 
rates. Drought funds would be used to subsidise interest 
costs on money borrowed commercially by farmers to 
alleviate the financial consequences of drought. 
Under this proposal a 
to the RAS for money. 
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farmer would still make an application 
His eligibility and finance 
needs would be assessed under the RAS in the same 
way as is done currently. 
If a farmer is recommended to receive carry-on funds 
then the RAS instead of supplying the funds, pledges 
interest assistance. For example, a farmer may be 
assessed as requiring $50 00O to be repaid over 10 
years at say 9 per cent interest. The interest assist­ 
ance would be the difference between the RAS rate 
( 9  per cent) and the rate (say ll per cent) a bank 
would be prepared to charge on the principal borrowed 
over the same length, 
The bank would be lending at commercial rates; The 
farmer would receive carry-on funds at a concessional 
rate. The advantage of using RAS funds for interest 
payments rather than principal lendings is that many 
more farmers could receive assistance. In periods 
of drought when social and political pressures mount 
to urge governments to provide assistance, RAS funds 
could be used to widen assistance by using the interest 
concession scheme, yet involve governments in little 
additional short term expenditure. 
The weaknesses of the interest concession scheme are 
several. First, there would be an incentive for banks 
to charge RAS clients a higher rate of interest on 
carry-on funds than they otherwise would. However, 
this incentive could be offset by competition between 
banks for the RAS clients and by the RAS negotiating 
with individual banks to lower interest rate charges 
on carry-pn loans. Secondly, as with many forms of 
assistance, the RAS welfare assistance would be capitalized 
into the value of land in drought-affected areas relative 
to areas free of drought. Thirdly, as already noted, 
banks tend to become overly conscious of the security 
of loans during a time of drought. Hence, they will 
refuse to lend, even at full commercial rates. 
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E. Information and Extension Services 
The main thrust of present drought relief measures 
is financial assistance. However, there is a case 
for broadening assistance to information and extension 
services. In times of natural disaster, such as drought, 
the demand for these services can exceed their supply. 
Farmers require the services in order to act swiftly 
to save stock, retain soil,  reduce costs - in short, 
minimise the deleterious effects of drought. 
Commonwealth and State Government funds could be used 
in several ways to increase information and extension 
services to farmers in drought affected or drought 
prone areas: 
additional funds for printing and disseminating 
information on drought assistance, drought management 
practices, soil and water conservation techniques, 
etc.  
special funds for travel and accommodation to increase 
the mobility of those advising farmers in drought­ 
affected or drought-prone areas. 
special funds for the contractual employment of 
additional advisers. These advisers may be from 
other State Departments of Agriculture with expertise 
relevant to the local drought, farm consultants 
or farmers competent to advise in drought management. 
because it is likely that State departments will 
incur additional costs in re-organising their advisory 
services to better service drought-affected farmers, 
there may be a need for some of these costs to 
be recouped from State and Commonwealth Governments. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Current subsidies such as the interest subsidy, fodder 
subsidy, agistment fees and haulage concessions, etc,  
be largely replaced with loan funds provided through 
the Rural Adjustment Scheme. 
Specific subsidies should be used, but only where a 
specific policy objective can be identified, for example 
for the conservation of soils, it may be desirable 
to subsidise off-farm agistment. Again, in a situation 
of national drought it may be desirable to subsidise 
stock feeding to maintain the national flock or herd. 
In periods of drought the major form of assistance 
should be through the RAS. Funds should be allocated 
on a case by case basis, following an examination of 
needs and abilities. Drought declaration need not 
be a pre-requisite for a farmer making application 
to the RAS. 
Special information and advisory services should be 
chargeable against drought assistance funds. 
ATTACHMENT 1 
REPORT TO DROUGHT CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE 
by J. Ripley, 20 September, 1982 
Drought Situation Morawa Area 
I visited Morawa on 14,  1 5  and 16 of September at the request of the 
Drought Consultative Committee to interview drought affected farmers 
in the area. Farmers in the area had been notified of the visit and 
requested to bring in financial and other data relative to their 
situation. About 50 farmers were interviewed and details of their 
situation recorded. 
The attached survey results show the detai ls  of survey averages for 1982 
and they are compared with survey averages for the Morawa shire in 1979 
and for farmers with drought loans in 1979 .  The farmers interviewed 
were mostly from the Morawa Shire with a few from Perenjori and Latham 
and some had properties in other Shires. The sample farmers were from 
the following major local ities  and areas: 
Cann a 8 
Guth a 12 
Pintharuka 8 
Mor awa South 6 
Mor awa West 3 
Mor awa East 5 
Perenjori 8 Latham 5 
47 
Those attending were mainly from the North and North East of Morawa. 
Two share farmers also attended the meetings but are not included 
in the results. 
At the time of the interviews useful rainfall  fell in the Morawa area 
so the influence of this rain was taken into account when making yield 
estimates. It must be emphasised that there i s  potential for significant 
inaccuracy in the estimates, 
at the end of September. In 
producing sufficient only 
between 0.2  and 0.8 t/ha. 
the sample 6 farms estimated a yield 
the balance 41 estimate yields 
The average estimated income from grains for the 
and more accurate estimates w i l l  be available 
for seed wheat, 
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harvest i s  about $41 000 which is about 30% of the normal expected income 
say S123 000. Grain estimated incomes are therefore down by around 
$80 000 per farm. 
Taking into account present debt situation and anticipated loan repayments 
in 1983, and crop programme for 1983 cash requirements for 1983 were 
estimated. The average per farm peak debt was estimated at $87 000 which 
i s  about $46 000 above normal expected carry on finance availabil ity.  
Included in the costs for 1983 are $20 000 H .P .  repayments and about 
$9 000 other loan repayments. The costs exclude any repayments on 
drought loans. 
The question of how hard farmers should be pressed to defer H . P .  debts 
requires attention. H . P .  repayments are now a significant component 
(24%) of the debt and deferment may only lead to future cash flow 
problems. Assuming some deferment of H . P .  say 30% and some loan repayment 
deferment the peak requirement may be reduceable by $10 000 and so be 
lowered to $77 000. This i s  about $36 000 above normal working credit 
l imits of $41 000. 
The interest rate subsidy payable by the Federal Government w i l l  also 
reduce the lending required. At this stage it is not known if the subsidy 
i s  payable on deferred loans or deferred H .P .  payments. This point 
requires clarification. 
Should the interest subsidy only be payable if H .P. and other loan 
payments are met then the minimal deferral of H . P .  or other loan re­ 
payments w i l l  be of maximum benefit to farmers. 
The proposed $40 000 maximum drought loans should be adequate (provided 
yie ld  estimates for 1982 are rea l istic )  for most farmers drought 
affected in the Morawa Shire. Some farmers have requirements far in 
excess of the $40 000 available and w i l l  have to obtain substantial 
loan repayment deferal and increased normal lender funding. It is also 
estimated that three of those interviewed w i l l  have little prospect of 
servicing their borrowing commitments. 
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There were some farmers interviewed who indicated that they may have 
large income tax accounts for payment in 1983. Estimates of these 
were included in the costs but in most cases these w i l l  need verification 
by accountants. 
The question of the situation of local business men was also raised. 
Apparently some of them have high levels of outstanding accounts and 
there may be a need to ensure that drought loans are applied to reducing 
these accounts as well as for general carry on. 
At t h i s  stage it i s  not possible to estimate with any accuracy the number 
of farmers l ikely to require drought funding. The September rainfall  
has significantly reduced the potential number from the northern 
agricultural areas. There are about 270 farmers in the Morawa. Mullewa 
and Perenjori Shires and the number of applicants from these shires could 
be around 100. 
SURVEY RESULTS 
No in sample 
Total farm area ha 
Cleared area ha 
Sharefarm of lease ha 
Area planted (own farm) ha 
Wheat 
Barley, Oats, Lupins 
Area planted (leased sharefarm) ha 
Wheat 
Other 
Total crop area 
Estimated Grain Yields 
Wheat t/ha 
Other crops t/ha 
Wheat to be delivered/farm t 
Other crops 
1979 (Mor awa) 1982 
96 47 
2 126 2 454 
l 595 945 
237 282 
669 046 
183 l 09 
94 282 
3 
849 437 
0 .35  
Negligible 
387 
Neglio ib le  
Planned 1 
1 210 
93 
169 
472 
Estimated Income/Farm Dec 1982 to Nov 1983 
Wheat 40 635 
Wool 1 1  351 
Sheep 5 218 
Pigs 1 532 
TOTAL 58 754 
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L i a b i l i t i e s  
1979 
Farm With 1979 
1982 % Drought Loans % Morawa % 
- 
Amount owing to: 
Trading Bank W/Ac 16 745 10 14 6 1 1  1 1  10 749 13 
Stock Firm W/Ac 6 3 1 5  5  677 2 437 
Trading Bank T /L 1 3  006 14 444 8 394 
P . I. B . A .  2  501 
C.Dev.Bank 7  340 8 598 5 172 
Rural Adjustment 8 6 1 7  9  818 4 466 
Drought Relief Loans 42 590 24 29 378 21 18 940 22 
Vendor 1 5  362 14 546 1 3  020 
Family & Other 20 782 1 1  846 7 214 
Hire Purchase 42 678 24 25 932 19 13 331 16 
Sundry Creditors 2 074 1 047 
TOTAL 1 7 5  936 137 834 84 770 
Av. debt $/crop ha 122 107 95 
1982 Survey Per Farm Average Estimates 
Estimated Peak Debt 1982 
Working Account Limit 1982 
Estimated Peak Debt 1983 
Estimated Working Account Limit 1983 
loan Repayments 1983 
Banks, Vendors, RAA 
H .P .  and Lease 
$33 073 
$36 457 
$87 327 
$41 660 
$ 8  712  (Drought Relief Loans Excludec 
$20 341 
ATTACHMENT 2 
RURAL ADJUSTMENT SCHEME 
LONG TERM and Y.I.Y.O. BUDGETS 
Date . Name . No . 
LAST 
12 months 
(Actual) 
INCOME 
Item Quantity STABLE DROUGHT 
. W o o l . . . 7 5 . 4 2 5 .  
.Sheep..Sales....21.600. 
.48.530. ..30.148, .51..9.2.8 
.21.800.......... 0.......0 
TOTAL INCOME 97 025 70 330 30 418 51 928 
.13.000. ~13 000, 8 000 
-..300. 300 300, ...300 
. .1.800. .1,200, 3. 000 
16. 000. 13 600 8 300 12 000 
- 1 . 5 oo . " r s 6 6 ;  756 l.75dd 
. 2.200. 
.  5.000. ..6.000.,.. 6..000, .6..000 
1.......600.. 600 600 600 
. 1.800., i8~, i s l  is~6 
.1.200. ....1.200.,. 1..200. 1..200 
. . 1 . 2 0 0. . . . 1 .  200., ...1.2001...1.200 
...1....400........1......400.,.........400%.........40¥ 
(a) • 
Farm Production Costs 
Fertilisers 
Crop Costs 
Stock Costs purchases. 
other (b) ... 
Fuel, oil.. 
Labour.... 
Repairs.. 
Contract, hire, cartage • 
Rates, Land Tax, Water. 
Insurances ..• 
Licenses, Phone, Subs..... 
Sundries().... 
Household, educ. .... 
Taxation. 
Plant replacement .• 
Loan Repayments.. 
Interest--work a/cs 
Capital Development (d). 
Inflation. 
TOTAL COSTS • 
10. 500 
.  .4.60  
.  8.000. 
. 9.500. 
...3..000. 
..87..600. 
10.500.. .10.500%.10.500 
........... 4.0Q . 
. .8.000.....8.000%........... 
.6..050....6..050%. 6..050 
•• .3..000..... ...5.000..9..500 
....77..750 ...58..050..68..050 
Surplus/Deficit .........coo..... 
.+9.425 .-7. 420, . - 2 7 . 6 3 2. - 1 6 . 1 2 2 .  
RRA Borrowings...oo.. 
RRA Payments . . o o o o . . . . . 1 .  
Remaader •... 
(a) Crop Costs: Sprays S...........; Seed S............; Insurance S...........; Cartage S............; Grazing S.... ......Hay S.......o...  
(b) Stock Costs: Shearing S............: Crutching S...........; Mules S...........: Vaccines S............: Vet. $..........., Fodder S............ 
te) sundries Bani Changes s.12, Accoungs.'?_, A d v i se r $. . .. . L e g a l s . . .  
(d Capital Development. Clearing S........... Fencing S...........; Water S..... . . . ..+ o.. . . . . .$ 
s ..... 
LIVESTOCK SCHEDULE 
Name 
Flock Herd 
No. 
Year STABLE FLOCK DROUGHT DROUGHT + 1 DROUGHT + 2 
No. $/hd $ No. $/hd $ No. S/hd $ No. $/hd $ 
Opening EWES 3000 3000 2000 2800 
WE THERS 1000 1000 
HOGGETS 2100 2100 1000 1200 
RAMS 75 75 60 60 
Purchases RAMS 15 120 1800 10 120 1200 25 120 3000 
Births 2100 1500 1200 1960 
TOTAL SOURCES 
Deaths EWES 150 300 140 100 
WE THERS 50 e 
HOGGETS 150 ... fee .. 
Sales RAMS 15 t 10 . .  
LAMBS 500 6.00 3000 
EWES e 0 e . - - - 140o 2.00 2800 
WE THERS 
... e « . .. .  950 8.00 7600 
HOGGETS 0e E e  .... 1200 7.00 8400 
losing 
EWES 
. ,.. 1 2ee . . ..  2660 
WE THERS 
RAMS 1650 700 e 1 1 2 0  
LAMBS 75 60 60 75 
2100 1000 1200 1960 
TOTAL USES 
PRODUCTION No. /hd Total No. /hd Total No. /hd Total No. /hd Total 
EWES 2900 4 . 7  13630 2800 3 . 5  10080 1950 4.0 7800 2730 4 . 7  12831 
WETHERS 950 5 . 2  4940 950 3 .6  3420 
HOGGETS 2000 4 .... 2000 3.0  6000 04 2 5 a 1160 d o  4640 
RAMS 75 d e . - - 60 6 .0  600 .. f t ... + ( Ce 
LAMBS 2100 1 < e  1000 1.0 1000 , � - -  t  et  . .  -  -  1960 1 5 2940 
TOTAL PROD. 8025 £ . 6810 21100 4 1 s o  20771 
ROCEEDS 30170 ks @ 250¢ 21000 ks @ 230¢ 13225 kg @ 230¢ 20771 ko @ 250¢ 
WOOL NET. $75 425 $48 530 $30 418 $51 928 
SHEEP SALES $21 600 $21 800 $ 0 $ 0 
9927$ 8 89 
